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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
POLLAK, District Judge 
 
This products liability case was commenced in a 
Pennsylvania state court and was then removed, on 
grounds of diversity, to the District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania. After discovery had begun under 
the supervision of a Magistrate Judge, the parties agreed to 
have the Magistrate Judge take full charge of the case with 
responsibility for its disposition. Thereafter, the Magistrate 
Judge granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. 
From that judgment plaintiff has appealed. 
 
In granting summary judgment, the Magistrate Judge 
concluded that a party who has asserted conflicting factual 
positions in two different affidavits has done so in bad faith 
and should be barred by judicial estoppel from adopting the 
second position, even where the parties and the Magistrate 
Judge recognize that the second position is more likely 
truer to the underlying facts. We find that the Magistrate 
Judge abused his discretion by (1) invoking judicial 
estoppel without considering the sufficiency of less extreme 
sanctions that he might have found available under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or federal statutes, or 
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under the court's inherent power, and (2) determining that 
the fact that a party has espoused two inconsistent 
positions is, without more, conclusively demonstrative of 
bad faith. We will therefore vacate the judgment entered by 




Plaintiff Janet Klein worked for a Pittsburgh printer, 
where she operated a commercial printing machine known 
as a "buckle folder," which folded paper and trimmed it as 
it flowed out of the machine. The parties agree that, at least 
if improperly used, several parts of the buckle folder are 
capable of causing injury. There is an "upper slitter," which 
is a rotating shaft equipped with cutting knives, located 
above the level of the output table, and there is a"lower 
slitter" of somewhat different construction below the table. 
The two are not far apart. 
 
Though the folded paper flowed onto a "delivery table," 
the machine did not include a depository for the trimmed 
paper scraps. Klein and her co-workers generally placed 
cardboard boxes on the floor below the place from which 
the paper flowed. The paper scraps fell into the boxes in 
what the plaintiff describes as a "pillar-like effect," and 
when the pillar of paper scraps built up to the part of the 
machine in which the rotating shafts and knife blades were 
located, Klein would pat the pillar down. On February 22, 
1992, when Klein was reaching to pat a pillar down, her 
hand made contact with part of the machine and was 
seriously injured. 
 
II. Procedural History 
 
Klein sued the machine's manufacturer (Stahl GMBH & 
Co. Maschinefabrik) and its American distributor 
(Heidelberg USA) in state court, alleging that she had 
"attempted to clear scrap paper that had accumulated 
underneath the machine when her right hand became 
trapped in the unguarded and unprotected folding rollers." 
Complaint P4. The defendants removed the case to federal 
court on diversity grounds, and the District Judge to whom 
the matter was assigned referred the case to a Magistrate 
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Judge for the conduct of the pretrial phases of the 
litigation. 
 
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on 
June 17, 1996 ("first summary judgment motion"), 
asserting that the machine had been built and distributed 
with "a barrier guard protecting the nip point between the 
slitter shaft and the shaft below it." A104. Klein responded 
to the motion by arguing that there had never been a 
barrier guard on the machine during her year and a half on 
the job. She argued in the alternative that if there ever had 
been a guard, "it interfered with the efficient operation of 
the machine and it was never identified as a guard or other 
type of safety device." Pl. Br. at 6. 
 
Klein's last contention in her response to the first 
summary judgment motion set the direction for much of 
the pre-trial practice that followed, and forms an important 
ingredient of the subject of this appeal. Klein argued that a 
barrier guard -- even if one had been present on the 
machine and did not interfere with its operation-- would 
not have prevented her injury "because she was injured on 
the upper slitter shaft, not at the location of the lower 
slitter shaft and drive shaft where the guard was designed 
to be installed." Id. In support of this last statement, Klein 
attached an affidavit dated July 10, 1996 in which she 
swore that "[e]ven if the [barrier guard] had been in place 
before my accident it would not have prevented my accident 
because my hand made contact with the upper slitter shaft 
located above the area where the [barrier guard] is located 
. . . ." A149-50 (hereinafter the "first affidavit"). 
 
Surprised by Klein's contention that she had been 
injured through contact with the upper slitter shaft-- not 
the lower slitter shaft, where they had presumed the injury 
had occurred -- the defendants, by letter, informed the 
Magistrate Judge that there was some likelihood that 
Klein's response had rendered the summary judgment 
motion moot and requested twenty days in which to 
"investigate whether [they] wish[ed] to file a reply brief or 
take some other action." A151. The Magistrate Judge 
granted the request. A153. The defendants subsequently 
decided not to file any further response to the summary 
judgment motion. On November 15, 1996, the Magistrate 
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Judge ruled on the defendants' first motion for summary 
judgment: 
 
       . . . counsel for defendants having sent the court a 
       letter . . . asserting that the facts presented in the 
       response to the motion may result in the motion being 
       rendered moot . . . [and] it appearing to the court that 
       defendants' motion for summary judgment has been 
       rendered moot by these developments; 
 
        IT IS ORDERED that the defendants' motion for 
       summary judgment (Docket #17) is withdrawn as 
       MOOT. 
 
A176-77. The order made no mention of Klein's first two 
arguments -- that there had been no barrier guard affixed 
to the machine during the period that she operated the 
machine, and, alternatively, that if there was a guard or 
other safety device auxiliary to the machine it had not 
functioned properly and had not been properly labeled. 
 
On January 27, 1997, the District Court, acting pursuant 
to the parties' agreement, assigned the case to the 
Magistrate Judge for disposition. Three days later, the 
defendants submitted three motions in limine, one of which 
sought "to preclude evidence of subsequent accidents/ 
incidents occurring on the same machine." A194-204. In 
particular, the defendants sought to preclude evidence of 
an accident suffered subsequent to Klein's accident by 
Carol Lamothe -- one of Klein's former co-workers-- on the 
same machine.1 The motion relied chiefly on the following 
short excerpt from deposition testimony that Lamothe had 
given in a case that she had also brought against Stahl and 
Heidelberg: 
 
       Q. If I asked you to point on one of these photographs 
       to the place where your hand got caught, could 
       you do that or no? 
 
       A. No, I could not. 
 
A195; see also A208. Defendants argued that the 
deposition testimony showed "that there is no evidence that 
Ms. Lamothe caught her hand in the same location where 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The same attorney represented both Klein and Lamothe. 
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the plaintiff in the case at bar alleges that she caught her 
hand." A195. Because Lamothe did not know precisely 
where her hand was caught, and Klein had averred in her 
first affidavit that her "hand made contact with the upper 
slitter shaft," A150, defendants contended that evidence of 
the Lamothe accident was not probative, or at least was 
more prejudicial than probative. A196. 
 
The Magistrate Judge granted the motion and precluded 
the evidence. A218. Relying on Barker v. Deere & Co., 60 
F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 1995) -- which holds that a"district court 
must be apprised of the specific facts of previous accidents 
in order to make a reasoned determination as to whether 
the prior accidents are `substantially similar' " and thus 
admissible in evidence -- the Magistrate Judge reasoned as 
follows: 
 
       [Lamothe stated] that she cannot point to the place on 
       the machine where her hand got caught. Plaintiff has 
       described with some specificity where her hand got 
       caught in the machine. She states that she was patting 
       down paper which had accumulated in a box adjacent 
       to the machine, and that her hand got caught in the 
       "upper slitter shaft." Plaintiff has presented several 
       pages from Ms. Lamothe's deposition in which she 
       states that she was patting down scrap paper, and that 
       her hand got caught in the machine, but that she is 
       not sure where it got caught. On the evidence 
       presented, it is not clear that the accidents occurred in 
       "substantially similar" circumstances . . . . 
 
A216 (citations to record omitted). 
 
Klein subsequently learned through discovery that 
several other accidents had occurred on the same machine. 
The defendants, apparently aware that Klein had learned 
this information, filed a new motion in limine on June 17, 
1997, seeking to preclude evidence of these accidents. 
A219-21. On the same day, the defendants filed a separate 
motion in limine, seeking to preclude Klein's expert witness 
from testifying about the guard on the lower slitter shaft or 
guards that Stahl was then developing. A9. In the new 
motion in limine seeking to preclude evidence of other 
accidents on the same machine, the defendants argued that 
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preclusion of evidence of other accidents was necessary 
because Klein had not demonstrated that the accidents 
were substantially similar to her own accident. A220. Of 
the six accidents, three had occurred through contact with 
the lower slitter; other than one accident -- in which the 
victim had not described the point of contact -- none 
involved the upper slitter. A223. 
 
Klein's counsel responded to both of the June 17, 1997 
motions in limine with one memorandum. See A10. The 
memorandum addressed the issue of evidence of other 
accidents by changing the factual averments that Klein had 
made in her first affidavit. Specifically, Klein's 
memorandum in opposition stated that: 
 
       At the time of contact between the plaintiff 's hand and 
       the machine, the plaintiff was not in a position where 
       she could have seen the precise location on the 
       machine where her hand was injured. The general area 
       of the machine where the accident occurred contains 
       five shafts, four of which rotate. The shafts are all 
       within approximately one foot of each other. In normal 
       operation, the view of the rotating shafts is blocked by 
       a delivery table onto which product is fed from the 
       production end of the folder. The area is illuminated 
       only by ambient light, with light from overhead blocked 
       by the delivery table. At the time of her accident, the 
       plaintiff's view of the area would have been further 
       obstructed by scrap paper which had built up from a 
       cardboard box situated on the floor all the way up to 
       the area of the rotating shafts. The plaintiff, even if she 
       had been attempting to locate the area where her hand 
       eventually made contact with the machine, would have 
       been unable to do so. Naturally, when contact with the 
       machine occurred, her primary focus was on 
       extricating her hand, not attempting to pinpoint precise 
       parts of the machine causing the lacerations for 
       purposes of future litigation. 
 
A230-31. Moreover, the memorandum indicated that Klein 
had "not set up the machine" and "was not trained or 
skilled in setting up the machine and was never asked to 
do so. Her familiarity with the parts of the machine was, 
therefore, limited." A231. Perhaps recognizing that this shift 
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in factual averment might spark controversy, the 
memorandum went to some trouble to explain the shift: 
 
        The plaintiff, at the time that she made her affidavit, 
       understood that, at the time of her accident, the only 
       rotating shaft equipped with slitters or cutting knives 
       was the upper slitter shaft. Without being able to 
       directly see what caused her injury, the plaintiff 
       surmised, based upon information and belief, that the 
       rotating slitters affixed to the upper slitter shaft had 
       caused her injury. 
 
        It should be noted that the upper and lower slitter 
       shafts, based upon measurements made by the 
       plaintiff 's expert, are located less than one inch from 
       each other. Based upon her understanding that the 
       upper slitter shaft was the only one equipped with 
       slitters at the time of her accident, the close proximity 
       between the upper and lower slitter shafts, and her 
       inability to see exactly what had caused her 
       lacerations, the plaintiff's affidavit was supported by a 
       reasonable belief that the upper slitter shaft was the 
       culprit. 
 
        At the time of her affidavit the plaintiff was unaware 
       that the edges of the collars of the lower slitter shaft 
       were also capable of causing the types of lacerations 
       that she sustained. 
 
A231 (record citations and footnote omitted). Describing the 
progress of discovery, the memorandum suggested-- but 
did not expressly state -- that Klein had learned details 
about the buckle folder that caused her to change her 
factual averment.2 The memorandum did, however, assert 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Plaintiff 's brief before this court is considerably less indirect: 
 
       Following the submission of [Klein's first] affidavit, the 
depositions of 
       William Klein and Ronald Bereksazi were taken on November 4, 
       1996 in connection with [Lamothe's] case . . .. The testimony of 
the 
       deponents in that case revealed for the first time that the inside 
       edges of the collars on the lower slitter, when rotating at high 
       speeds, could cause the type of injury sustained by the plaintiff. 
       Faced with the information that the collars which were attached to 
       the lower slitter shaft at the time of the accident were sharp 
enough, 
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that "the defendants have consistently maintained that . . . 
[Klein's injury] had to have occurred between the lower 
slitter shaft and the drive shaft." A233. As evidence of that 
assertion, the memorandum pointed to a report by the 
defendants' corporate designee3 and the defendants' 
engineering expert.4 Given Klein's new factual averment, the 
memorandum argued, the six accidents were, manifestly, 
"substantially similar" to Klein's accident, thus requiring 
denial of the motion in limine. A233-34. The memorandum 
argued further that the court should reconsider its order 
granting defendants' earlier motion in limine to preclude 
evidence of the Lamothe accident. A234-36. 
 
The memorandum seemed simultaneously to maintain 
that Klein had not changed her position: 
 
       The plaintiff has always acknowledged that her injury 
       occurred at the production end of the machine which 
       contains a complex of four rotating shafts. She has 
       never stated that she actually saw the precise location 
       on the machine where her hand was injured. She was 
       simply not in a position to do so at the time of her 
       accident. . . . She has made a reasonable assumption, 
       upon which her affidavit is based, that the slitting 
       knives on the upper slitter shaft caused her injury. 
 
A234. In support of the proposition that Klein's position 
had not changed, the memorandum reminded the court 
that 
 
       The plaintiff has also proceeded on the alternative 
       theory . . . that if her hand was injured at the location 
       on the machine where the defendants insist it must 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       when rotating at high speeds, to lacerate her hand, the plaintiff 
       could no longer state with certainty that her hand had made contact 
       with the upper slitter shaft at the time of the accident. 
 
Pl. Br. at 10-11. 
 
3. "Based on the deposition of both Ms. Martin and Ms. Lamothe, their 
injuries must have occurred between the lower slitter shaft and the shaft 
below it." A233. 
 
4. "It is most probable that [Klein] became involved between the lower 
slitter collars and the drive shaft." A233. 
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       have been injured, the in-running nip point between 
       the lower slitter shaft and the drive shaft, and if the 
       machine came equipped with a guard at the time it was 
       distributed to Hoechstetter, her employer, then it was 
       entirely foreseeable . . . that the guard would be 




Klein's memorandum in opposition was supported by an 
affidavit in which Klein swore that "[w]hen I made the 
statement in my affidavit of July 10, 1996, that my injury 
occurred on the upper slitter shaft, I made that statement 
in the good faith belief that it was true." A394. The affidavit 
tracked the memorandum in its explanation of why Klein 
originally thought the injury occurred on the upper slitter, 
and how she came to think differently. See A394-95. The 
affidavit concluded with Klein's statement that"I can now 
no longer say with any certainty exactly where at the 
output end of the machine my injury occurred." A395. 
 
After the defendants filed a reply brief, the Magistrate 
Judge granted the motion in limine to preclude evidence of 
other accidents and denied plaintiff 's request for 
reconsideration. A277-83. The Magistrate Judge rejected 
Klein's contention that she had been "proceeding under 
alternate theories of how her injury occurred, i.e., either 
that it occurred at the upper slitter shaft, or that it 
occurred at the lower slitter shaft," A280, and found that 
plaintiff had changed her position. Without mentioning the 
doctrine of judicial estoppel or any finding that he might 
have made as to the disingenuousness of Klein's change of 
position, the Magistrate Judge held that "at this stage, 
plaintiff cannot be heard to assert that her injury occurred 
at any point on the machine other than the upper slitter 
shaft." A280. 
 
Several months later, on December 29, 1997, the 
defendants moved again for summary judgment (the 
"second summary judgment motion"). Aside from a 
recitation of the procedural background and the applicable 
legal standards, the brief contained only two paragraphs. In 
full, those paragraphs stated: 
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        Plaintiff alleges that her injuries occurred at the 
       upper slitter shaft. The affidavit of Severino Roderick, 
       attached hereto as exhibit "B", establishes that the 
       upper slitter shaft is not capable of causing injury, as 
       the exposed nip point is out running. It further would 
       have been physically impossible for plaintiff to reach 
       this point based on her description of her activities at 
       the time of her injury. 
 
        At this point, this fact is undisputed, and the burden 
       is on plaintiff to produce contrary evidence by way of 
       affidavit or deposition. It would be a waste of judicial 
       resources to conduct a trial on a theory which is 
       physically inconsistent with the undisputed facts, and 
       defendants' motion should be granted. 
 
A287-88 (emphasis in original). 
 
Klein's memorandum in opposition to the motion for 
summary judgment began by reiterating Klein's explanation 
of why her change in position had been the result of new 
information legitimately acquired during discovery. A298- 
99. Klein did not dispute that her injury could not have 
been caused by the upper slitter. The memorandum noted 
that "[t]he basis for the defendants' Motion is not entirely 
clear," A299, but hypothesized two possible bases for the 
second motion for summary judgment: the first involved 
Pennsylvania's substantive law of products liability, and the 
second was "that the defendants are entitled to summary 
judgment because they have demonstrated that the plaintiff 
Janet Klein is not infallible," A299 -- apparently meant as 
a reference to Klein's change in factual averments. As to the 
second, the memorandum stated: 
 
        The defendants seem to be arguing that, although 
       they (the manufacturer and distributor of this machine) 
       know that Janet Klein could only have been injured on 
       the lower slitter shaft, judgment should be entered in 
       their favor because Janet Klein mistakenly stated that 
       she was cut on the upper slitter shaft, based upon an 
       assumption that knives [present on the upper slitter] 
       cut and collars [present on the lower slitter] do not. In 
       other words, because Janet Klein might have made a 
       mistake in identifying the location of her injury in an 
       affidavit, they are entitled to judgment. 
 
                                11 
  
        Such an argument might have some merit if the 
       defendants could demonstrate some surprise leading to 
       prejudice. However, the defendants cannot raise that 
       argument because they cannot be surprised about 
       something they claim they already knew. The cynicism 
       is particularly virulent when considering that, in 
       connection with defendants' Motion In Limine to 
       exclude evidence of the Lamothe accident, they argued 
       that evidence of the Lamothe accident could not be 
       admitted in this case because the accidents were not 
       substantially similar, Klein's accident occurring in 
       what she "claimed" was the upper slitter shaft. As early 
       as that time, it is now obvious that the defendants 
       knew that, based upon their superior knowledge with 
       respect to the workings of this machine, Klein's 
       accident, as described by her and demonstrated in her 
       deposition, could have only involved the lower slitter 




Oral argument on the motion was held on February 3, 
1998. Klein's counsel began by describing the defendants' 
argument that they were entitled to summary judgment by 
virtue of Klein's change in position as "absurd and cynical." 
A332. He proceeded to address what he saw as "the real 
issue," which involved substantive Pennsylvania products 
liability law. A332-33. Counsel then returned to defendant's 
`absurd' argument, which he summarized as being:"we 
know what happened, but you aren't allowed to prove it, so 
we win." A334. He then explained to the court the way in 
which the progress of discovery had revealed facts to Klein 
that led her to change her factual position, A334-42, 
stating that Klein had sworn to her first affidavit "[i]n good 
faith." A338. The Magistrate Judge remarked that he 
thought it appropriate to reconsider his first summary 
judgment motion when deciding the second motion for 
summary judgment. A344-46. 
 
Before the Magistrate Judge adjourned the proceedings, 
plaintiff 's counsel made "a few comments on the estoppel 
issue." A349. 
 
        I'm not clear on what that means. I've never been 
       involved in a case where somebody makes a good faith 
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       but erroneous statement under oath, and I always 
       thought that was a matter for cross examination. I've 
       never heard of it causing a default by the plaintiff. 
 
        The plaintiff is going to have to get up and testify to 
       what she knows, and then she's going to be confronted 
       by [defense counsel] with the [first] affidavit, and she's, 
       she's going to give her explanation . . . . 
 
A349. In response, the Magistrate Judge explained to 
plaintiff 's counsel that defense counsel was"arguing 
judicial estoppel." Id. The Magistrate Judge then explained 
his understanding of the law of judicial estoppel. A350-53. 
He did not use the term "bad faith." He acknowledged that 
plaintiff 's counsel had "argue[d] alternatively throughout" 
-- i.e., argued that if the accident had occurred at the lower 
slitter the barrier guard allegedly installed was improperly 
designed, or that the accident had occurred at the upper 
slitter -- but stated that the conflict between Klein's first 
and second affidavits might nonetheless require him to 
apply judicial estoppel. A351-52. 
 
The Magistrate Judge issued his opinion granting the 
second summary judgment motion one week later, on 
February 10, 1998. The central question he addressed was 
whether Klein should "be judicially estopped from now 
asserting that her hand was caught in the lower slitter 
shaft?" A315. To answer that question, the Magistrate 
Judge set forth what he believed to be the threshold inquiry 
for the application of judicial estoppel: " `(1) Is the party's 
present position inconsistent with a position formerly 
asserted? (2) If so, did the party assert either or both in bad 
faith -- i.e., "with intent to play fast and loose" with the 
court?' " A315-16 (quoting McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 
F.3d 610, 618 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Ryan Operations G.P. 
v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 361 (3d Cir. 
1996)). The Magistrate Judge thought that the first 
question had to be answered in the affirmative, because 
Klein's two affidavits directly conflicted. A316. He did not 
find it significant that, in her memorandum in opposition to 
the defendants' first motion for summary judgment, Klein 
had argued in the alternative -- either (1) there was not a 
barrier guard, or (2) the removal of the lower barrier guard 
was foreseeable or (3) she had injured her hand in the 
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upper slitter. The Magistrate Judge believed that the 
relevant conflict was not the conflict between the 
memorandum in opposition to the first motion for summary 
judgment and the memorandum in opposition to the 
second motion for summary judgment, but the conflict 
between the affidavit submitted in support of the 
memorandum in opposition to the first motion for summary 
judgment and the affidavit submitted in response to the 
defendants' second series of motions in limine. A316-17. 
 
Having concluded that Klein's positions were 
inconsistent, the Magistrate Judge went on to consider 
whether Klein had assumed either of her positions in bad 
faith. He acknowledged that not all changes in position 
during litigation are undertaken in bad faith, but felt that 
this one was: 
 
       In this case, however, plaintiff asserts that she was 
       never sure where her hand contacted the machine, but 
       simply assumed that it was the upper slitter shaft 
       since she believed (mistakenly) that the lower slitter 
       shaft could not have caused her injuries. This lack of 
       assurance concerning how the accident occurred, 
       however, is not reflected in plaintiff 's affidavit, or in 
       counsel's argument in response to defendants' initial 
       motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff 's statement is 
       made without equivocation (not, for example, to the 
       best of her knowledge and belief). If plaintiff was 
       unsure where her hand came in contact with the 
       machine, she could (and should) simply have said so. 
       Instead, she stated as a fact, known to her, that her 
       hand came into contact with the upper slitter shaft. 
       Further, she did so with the intent that this 
       representation would defeat the motion for summary 
       judgment. 
 
        In this case, the unequivocal nature of plaintiff 's 
       affidavit and counsel's argument (not to mention the 
       reliance of plaintiff 's expert on plaintiff 's affidavit) 
       militate against a finding that she was previously 
       unsure of the facts, and that she is now simply making 
       clear was what [sic] left unclear before. 
 
A317-18. The Magistrate Judge acknowledged that Klein 
asserted she had not sworn to either affidavit in bad faith, 
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but stated that "[i]n the context of judicial estoppel . . . bad 
faith is defined as playing [fast] and loose with the court." 
A319. The Magistrate Judge thought that Klein had`played 
fast and loose' with the court by attesting, in herfirst 
affidavit, "to a version of the facts which she knew was not 
accurate." Id. (The Magistrate Judge implied that, had Klein 
conditioned her first affidavit -- e.g., by introducing it with 
words such as "to the best of my knowledge and belief " -- 
he would not have found that she had `played fast and 
loose' with the court. A318-19.) Accordingly, Klein was held 
by the Magistrate Judge to be judicially estopped from 
arguing that her hand was injured in the lower slitter. 
Since Klein had not produced any evidence refuting the 
defendants' claim that her hand could not have been 
injured in the upper slitter, the Magistrate Judge granted 
summary judgment. A319-20, 324. 
 
Before concluding his opinion, the Magistrate Judge 
made it plain that granting summary judgment was not an 
easy course to pursue. A320. He noted that "[t]he reader 
may well wonder how plaintiff can be put out of court 
when, after all, she is now simply trying to prove that she 
was injured precisely where defendants have consistently 
maintained she must have been injured." Id. 5 To justify 
invoking judicial estoppel despite his "real reluctance," the 
Magistrate Judge returned to what he saw as the 
underlying rationale of judicial estoppel: it "is designed to 
avoid the type of unnecessary litigation the parties and this 
court have just gone through." Id. 
 
       Had plaintiff 's affidavit been accurate (e.g., had it 
       stated that she was unsure where her hand contacted 
       the machine, but assumed that it was in the area of 
       the upper slitter shaft), the efficient administration of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. After granting summary judgment, the Magistrate Judge explained at 
some length what would have happened if Klein had stated in her first 
affidavit that she was not sure where her hand had made contact with 
the buckle folder, A321-24, concluding that Klein's"claim would have 
survived summary judgment." A321. The Magistrate Judge made it plain 
that, even if Klein had not claimed in her first affidavit that she 
injured 
her hand in the upper slitter, he would have found that Klein's argument 
that the removal of the barrier guard was foreseeable precluded 
summary judgment. A323-4 & n.1. 
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       this case would have been promoted. As it is, the 
       inaccuracy which plaintiff alleges exists in her earlier 
       affidavit has caused this court to once again revisit 
       summary judgment instead of proceeding timely to 




Plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, 
A434-35, to which defendants responded, A446-48. The 
Magistrate Judge denied the motion. A12. Klein then timely 
appealed under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
III. Standard of Review 
 
We review the application of judicial estoppel under an 
"abuse of discretion" standard. McNemar v. Disney Store, 
Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 613 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 
1115 (1997). We exercise plenary review over a grant of 
summary judgment. Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam- 




A. The Sequential Order of Use of Sanctions 
 
As the Magistrate Judge correctly noted, this circuit's 
"doctrine of judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine which 
vests considerable discretion in the court." A315 (citing 
McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 617 (3d Cir. 
1996)). Proper exercise of that discretion requires the court 
to focus attentively on the particularly distinctive features 
of the case before the court, since "each case must be 
decided upon its own particular facts and circumstances." 
McNemar, 91 F.3d at 617 (citing Ryan Operations, 81 F.3d 
at 360).6 There are, therefore, few overarching principles 
about the proper application of judicial estoppel that cover 
all cases. But some generalizations can be ventured: 
"judicial estoppel is an `extraordinary remed[y] to be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 119 S.Ct. 1597 (1999) 
casts doubt on the particular holding in McNemar, but it does not call 
into question the principles stated in McNemar which we quote. 
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invoked when a party's inconsistent behavior will otherwise 
result in a miscarriage of justice.' " Ryan Operations, 81 
F.3d at 365 (citing Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United 
Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 424 (3d Cir. 1988) (Stapleton, 
J., dissenting)). Further, as we learn from case law dealing 
with other forms of judicial sanctions, a trial court should 
consider invoking its inherent sanctioning powers only 
where no sanction established by the Federal Rules or a 
pertinent statute is "up to the task" of remedying the 
damage done by a litigant's malfeasance, Chambers v. 
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991), and only then when 
the sanction is "tailored to address the harm identified," 
Republic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 
F.3d 65, 73 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
Judicial estoppel is one arrow in the quiver of sanctions 
at a court's disposal. Each of those arrows is a defensive 
weapon, loosed to protect the integrity of the court's 
processes. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 
(1991) ("A primary aspect of [a district court's] discretion is 
the ability to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct 
which abuses the judicial process."); McNemar v. Disney 
Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 616 (3d Cir. 1996) ("[t]he doctrine 
of judicial estoppel serves a consistently clear and 
undisputed jurisprudential purpose: to protect the integrity 
of the courts."). A trial court should avail itself of its 
inherent sanctioning power only when absolutely 
necessary. As the Supreme Court has said, "[b]ecause of 
their very potency, inherent powers must be exercised with 
restraint and discretion." Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44. 
 
In Chambers, the Court addressed a district court's 
decision to require a plaintiff who had engaged in repeated 
and varied misbehavior to pay almost a million dollars to 
defendant to defray defendant's attorney's fees and related 
litigation expenses. Writing for the Court, Justice White 
noted that a federal court is not "forbidden to sanction bad- 
faith conduct by means of the inherent power simply 
because that conduct could also be sanctioned under[a 
federal] statute or the Rules." 501 U.S. at 50. He warned 
that "[a] court must, of course, exercise caution in invoking 
its inherent power, and it must comply with the mandates 
of due process . . . in determining that the requisite bad 
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faith exists . . . ." Id. Thus, "when there is bad-faith 
conduct in the course of litigation that could be adequately 
sanctioned under the Rules, the court ordinarily should 
rely on the Rules rather than the inherent power." Id. But 
"if in the informed discretion of the court, neither the 
statute [28 U.S.C. S 19277] nor the Rules are up to the task, 
the court may safely rely on its inherent power." Id. Justice 
White's statement of general principle -- that a court may 
rely on its inherent power where "neither the statute nor 
the Rules are up to the task" -- was followed directly by an 
application to the case then at bar that sheds light on the 
principles themselves: 
 
       It is true that the District Court could have employed 
       Rule 11 to sanction Chambers for filing "false and 
       frivolous pleadings," 124 F.R.D., at 138, and that some 
       of the other conduct might have been reached through 
       other Rules. Much of the bad-faith conduct by 
       Chambers, however, was beyond the reach of the 
       Rules; his entire course of conduct throughout the 
       lawsuit evidenced bad faith and an attempt to 
       perpetrate a fraud on the court, and the conduct 
       sanctionable under the Rules was intertwined within 
       conduct that only the inherent power could address. In 
       circumstances such as these in which all of a litigant's 
       conduct is deemed sanctionable, requiring a courtfirst 
       to apply Rules and statutes containing sanctioning 
       provisions to discrete occurrences before invoking 
       inherent power to address remaining instances of 
       sanctionable conduct would serve only to foster 
       extensive and needless satellite litigation . . . . 
 
Id. at 50-51. The foregoing suggests that the Rules are not 
"up to the task" when they would not provide a district 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. 28 U.S.C. S 1927 provides that: 
 
       Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court 
       of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the 
       proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be 
       required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, 
       expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such 
       conduct. 
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court with the authority to sanction all of the conduct 
deserving of sanction.8 
 
When the Rules or pertinent statutes are "up to the 
task," they should be used.9 When they are not, a trial 
court may turn to its inherent sanctioning power, but 
should exercise that power with caution.10  Within that 
inherent sanctioning power, judicial estoppel is often the 
harshest remedy. Cf. Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty 
Co., 747 F.2d 863, 867, 870 (3d Cir. 1984) (characterizing 
dismissal sanction as "extreme"). The Magistrate Judge in 
this case evidently thought himself confronted by an all-or- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Such an interpretation gains credence from the views of the dissenters 
in Chambers. Justice Scalia noted that he had "no doubt of a court's 
authority to go beyond the Rules in [the circumstances of the case]. And 
I agree with the Court that an overall sanction resting at least in 
substantial portion upon the court's inherent power need not be broken 
down into its component parts, with the actions sustainable under the 
Rules separately computed." Id. at 60. Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Souter, dissented on the ground that 
district courts could justify invocation of inherent sanctioning powers 
only where they can detail "special justification"; i.e., where a federal 
statute or Rule does not cover the misbehavior in question and where 
the court must sanction that misbehavior in order to safeguard its own 
functioning. Id. at 63. All nine Justices thus agreed on the minimum 
proposition that a federal district court considering sanctions should 
first turn to the Federal Rules and applicable statutes. 
 
9. Our prior decisions support this view. See Gillette Foods Incorp. v. 
Bayernwald-Fruchteverwertung, GmbH, 977 F.2d 809, 814 n.10 (3d Cir. 
1992) (assuming that a district court should consider the Federal Rules 
and applicable statutes before turning to its inherent powers); In Tutu 
Wells Contamination Litigation, 120 F.3d 368, 183 n.13 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(describing Chambers as having "observed . . . that normally a court 
should look first to those rule-based or statute-based powers before 
turning to its inherent powers"). 
 
10. We noted in In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litigation that the fact 
"[t]hat `inherent powers are shielded from direct democratic controls' 
makes [the] exercise of restraint and discretion even more important." 
120 F.3d 368, 383 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 
447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980)). By contrast, statutes are direct expressions 
of the people's representatives in Congress, and the Federal Rules -- 
though drafted by committees of the Judicial Conference composed of 
members of the bar, academia, and judges -- are subject to veto by 
Congress. 
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nothing choice: dealing with what he saw as bad faith 
through the invocation of judicial estoppel, or ignoring that 
bad faith. In electing to invoke judicial estoppel, the 
Magistrate Judge foreclosed a plaintiff with a potentially 
meritorious claim from presenting her case in court. 
 
Had the Magistrate Judge first asked whether the Rules 
were "up to the task," he might not have found himself 
confronting such a stark choice. The Federal Rules present 
a district court encountering perceived bad faith with less 
severe sanctions, such as the remedial sanction set forth in 
Rule 56(g), which vests a court with authority to charge the 
misfeasant with expenses, including attorney's fees, 
attributable to the additional litigation generated by a bad- 
faith affidavit -- and, where appropriate, to adjudge the 
misfeasant guilty of contempt.11 Such a sanction allows a 
court to penalize disingenuousness without foreclosing a 
potentially meritorious claim. 
 
Had the Magistrate Judge concluded that invoking the 
court's inherent sanctioning authority was preferable to use 
of Federal Rules or statutes -- either because the Rules and 
statutes did not cover a particular person or a particular 
act, or because misfeasance sanctionable under the Rules 
was intertwined with misfeasance not sanctionable under 
the Rules -- he would still have had available the full range 
of sanctions within the inherent power. A court choosing 
among such sanctions must "ensure that the sanction is 
tailored to address the harm identified." Republic of the 




11. Rule 56(g) states: 
 
       Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that 
any 
       of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in 
bad 
       faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith 
       order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
       amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the 
affidavits 
       caused the other party to incur, including reasonable attorney's 
       fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of 
       contempt. 
 
                                20 
  
B. Bad Faith Inquiry Prior to the Extreme Sanction of 
       Judicial Estoppel 
 
Judicial estoppel is not a sanction "tailored to address 
the harm" if it does not, at a minimum, pass the"two-part 
threshold inquiry" set out in Ryan Operations: 
 
       (1) Is the party's present position inconsistent with a 
       position formerly asserted? (2) If so, did the party 
       assert either or both of the inconsistent positions in 
       bad faith--i.e., "with intent to play fast and loose" with 
       the court? 
 
81 F.3d at 360 (citation omitted). 
 
The Magistrate Judge appears to have believed that (1) 
Klein knew when she swore to her first affidavit that she 
was not sure where her hand was injured and (2) Klein 
should have at least conditioned her first affidavit with 
words such as "to the best of my knowledge and belief." By 
considering Klein's initial failure to include conditional 
language as per se evidence of bad faith, the Magistrate 
Judge folded the second prong of the judicial estoppel test 
back into the first prong -- merely asking, again, whether 
the two affidavit positions were inconsistent. 12 As the 
Magistrate Judge observed, judicial estoppel can be a 
draconian sanction, one that should be invoked only with 
"reluctance." Ryan Operations sought to give analytical 
expression to that reluctance by requiring district courts to 
find bad faith in addition to inconsistency.13 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Klein does not seriously contest that her statements were 
contradictory. In her first affidavit, Klein asserted that her hand had 
been injured on the upper slitter. In her second affidavit, she stated 
that 
she could no longer be certain where her hand had been injured. In 
combination with her choice not to contest the defendants' argument 
that it was physically impossible for her hand to have been injured on 
the upper slitter, her second affidavit may be read to assert that she was 
not injured on the upper slitter. 
 
13. One need not read Ryan Operations's requirement for independent 
evidence of bad faith to mean, as plaintiff argues, that a district court 
must conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether a litigant has 
acted in bad faith whenever the court is considering applying judicial 
estoppel. There is no question that Ryan Operations stands for the 
 




If on remand the court finds that Klein acted in bad faith 
-- a finding that must be based on more than inconsistency 
in factual positions -- the court should lookfirst to Federal 
Rules and statutes. E.g., Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(g). If no Rule 
or statute appears appropriate -- or if, as in Chambers, the 
perceived misbehavior combines some actions that are 
sanctionable under Federal Rules and statutes and some 
actions that are not -- then the court should turn to its 
inherent sanctioning power. If the court turns to its 
inherent sanctioning power, it should select a sanction 
"tailored to address the harm identified." 
 
For the reasons set forth above, the order granting 
summary judgment will be vacated and the case remanded 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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proposition that a district court must "discern" intent, not "infer" it. 
See 
81 F.3d at 364. That does not mean, however, that Ryan Operations 
requires a district court to discern intent by way of an evidentiary 
hearing. The court in Ryan Operations did not consider a review of the 
record to be an improper way to discern intent; to the contrary, Ryan 
Operations assessed the appellant's intent by conducting its own review 
of the procedural history, rather than vacating the district court's 
finding 
of bad faith and remanding for an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 361-64. 
Moreover, the panel noted that in a predecessor case, Oneida Motor 
Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1988), "there 
was ample evidence in the record from which an inference of deliberate 
manipulation could be drawn." Ryan Operations, 81 F.3d at 363. In 
whatever way a trial court chooses to inquire into bad faith, it must of 
course "comply with the mandates of due process." Chambers, 501 U.S. 
at 50. We are not called on today to map the boundaries of the due 
process right in a case of this kind. 
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